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
USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

# CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL

**Air University**

**Air War College**

**Maxwell AFB, Alabama**



Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

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New York Times on the Web

February 27, 2002

## **Pentagon Sees Sample Rocket By '04**

WASHINGTON (AP) -- The United States probably will have prototype rockets capable of destroying an enemy's long-range missile available in about two years, Pentagon officials told Congress Wednesday.

The military plans to build silos for the interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska, about 100 miles southeast of Fairbanks, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said. He told a Senate Appropriations subcommittee that four prototype interceptors capable of shooting down an enemy missile should be in place there by September 2004.

The Defense Department is working to develop several ways to block long-range missiles fired at the United States. President Bush last year announced he was withdrawing the United States from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty that bans such anti-missile systems.

Russia and other countries oppose the decision.

The Pentagon has tested prototypes of missile interceptors fired from silos on land and Navy ships at sea in recent months. Although all of the most recent tests have destroyed dummy warheads, officials say the tests were designed to evaluate system components and were virtually guaranteed to knock down the dummy warheads anyway.

Designing, testing and building a system of land- and sea-based missile defenses would cost between \$23 billion and \$64 billion by 2015, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimated earlier this year.

Critics of the missile defense program say it's too expensive and question whether the defenses would really work.

Expecting to have prototype rockets capable of shooting down missiles ready by 2004 is unrealistic, critics said.

``It's wishful thinking," Chris Madison of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation said Wednesday.

The land-based program aimed at destroying long-range missiles in space is the furthest along -- and is the program that Wolfowitz said should have prototypes capable of shooting down a missile by 2004.

Gen. Ronald Kadish, head of the Defense Department's Missile Defense Agency, told the House Armed Services Committee Wednesday about plans to have operational prototypes ready in two years.

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Washington Times

February 28, 2002

Pg. 12

## **Rumsfeld Adviser Says Widen The War To Include Saddam**

By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times

The United States should expand the war against terrorism to Iraq by using air power and local opposition forces to oust Saddam Hussein from control before he builds nuclear weapons, a senior Pentagon policy adviser said yesterday.

Richard Perle, chairman of the Defense Policy Board, said in a speech that Saddam's stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and his aggressive program to build nuclear arms pose major threats to the United States. The board advises Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld on policy issues.

Mr. Perle said yesterday that "a failure to go after Iraq would be viewed around the world as having drawn a threshold in the war against terrorism well below the level of Saddam Hussein's Iraq."

Terrorists and their supporters would calculate that the United States lacked the will to confront a "real challenge" like Iraq, preferring instead to focus on weaker threats like the Taliban and Somalia, he said in a speech sponsored by the Hoover Institution, a California-based think tank.

An Iraqi defector revealed that Saddam had spread his nuclear weapons development program to more than 400 covert locations around the country, Mr. Perle said.

He said Iraq is determined to build nuclear weapons. "It could be tomorrow, it could be a year from now," he said.

"The question is can we afford to wait, hoping that Saddam will not take actions for which he is perfectly capable, as we waited prior to September 11 until we came to grips with Osama bin Laden?" Mr. Perle asked.

Mr. Perle said the United States should "act pre-emptively" to remove Saddam from power and replace his regime with a government that will permit the dismantling of Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs.

The strategy in Iraq should follow the Pentagon's recent successful model for Afghanistan, but would require more U.S. ground forces working with opposition groups in northern and southern Iraq, combined with precision bombing strikes, he said.

One option would be to set up an opposition government in northern Iraq that would force Saddam to mass his armored forces. Once the tanks are grouped, U.S. bombers could attack them and the loss would weaken Saddam's grip on power, Mr. Perle said.

"This is a case where an ounce of prevention seems to be called for," Mr. Perle said. "Apart from that, even before he crosses the nuclear threshold ... he has the potential today to distribute anthrax, which he has in quantities, to al Qaeda terrorists."

U.S. troops in the region right now might be enough for operations against Iraq, including a brigade of ground forces based in Kuwait and other U.S. troops on ships in the region, he said.

Frequent changes of Iraqi military leaders and arrests and executions of officers "suggests Saddam fears his own military establishment," Mr. Perle said.

"I don't believe we have to defeat Saddam's army," he said. "I think Saddam's army will defeat Saddam."

Mr. Perle also challenged a statement by former Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright that the Bush administration's anti-terrorist policy is an extension of the approach taken by the Clinton administration. "That's rubbish," he said. "And it's not just that the preceding administration acted so weakly and ineffectively, it never adopted the view that we would go after the states supporting terrorists and harboring terrorists. And without that policy, there is little chance that an open society like this can diminish the threat to the point where we can cope with it effectively."

The September 11 attacks were "inevitable" because the Clinton administration failed to take effective action against numerous terrorist assaults, including the 1996 bombing of a U.S. military barracks in Saudi Arabia and the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole.

"We need to fight terrorists over there because it is so difficult to fight them over here," he said.

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New York Times  
February 28, 2002

## **Electric Power System Is Called Vulnerable, And Vigilance Is Sought**

By Matthew L. Wald

LENEX, Mass., Feb. 27 — The computers that control the electric power system around the nation have been probed from the Middle East, and terrorists may have inspected the physical equipment, said experts at a conference on the security of the electric system.

Government experts identified nuclear power plants as perhaps the most attractive targets but said dams, gas pipelines and oil refineries were not far behind. Federal officials urged companies that generate, transmit and distribute electricity to take steps to increase security.

"In a single-superpower world, there's a single best target," said Lt. Col. Bill Flynt, director of the Threats to Critical Infrastructures program at the Foreign Military Studies office of the Army.

"You're the best face of that best target," Colonel Flynt told the power officials. "Your corporations are the best target set."

But the extent of the threat, and of the vulnerability, was not clear from the unclassified two-day conference, where a panel of government and industry experts refused to provide details about what they knew or how they knew it.

The electric system is set up to perform reliably even with significant component failures and to recover quickly from those failures. But it might not stand up to multiple coordinated attacks, and the Sept. 11 attacks demonstrated that such an event was possible. Some parts of the system, like transformers, are large, require months to build and are not held in inventory in an increasingly competitive industry that shuns expensive spares, experts said.

The conference brought together about 60 plant managers, power system administrators, state regulators and other experts from New York and New England to hear from officials of the F.B.I., the C.I.A. and state governments. The industry officials showed some frustrations about the murkiness of federal advice.

For example, James D. Castle, manager of operations at the New York Independent System Operator, or ISO, said the system was usually operated by running the cleanest and least expensive generating stations. But the system could be less vulnerable if plants close to the high demand cities were started up, to minimize the importance of transmission lines.

Mr. Castle, who is also the chairman of the Northeast Power Coordinating Council, which covers New York, New England, Ontario, Quebec and the Maritimes, said there was no consensus on when to do so. Members of the council have a once-a-week conference call on terrorist threats, he said, and have developed code words to discuss what actions to take to protect the power system from terrorist threat. The problem, he said, was that threats thus far have been vague.

"Is it really enough for me to change the way I run the power system, in other words, to pollute the air, and cost people money? Probably not," Mr. Castle said.

James Fortune, a program manager at the Electric Power Research Institute, a utility research consortium based in Palo Alto, Calif., said that computers used by a variety of critical industries had been probed by unknown intruders.

"We do know that surveillance has increased, from the Middle East," Mr. Fortune told the industry executives. "Where do you think the majority of those probes have gone? To us, the overall energy system," he said. In an interview, he said this had been verified by a computer security firm, but he would not give further details. "Are they surveilling now? That's what you do before you launch an attack," Mr. Fortune said, and he urged the participants to re-examine their computers.

Another speaker, Harvey Blumenthal, a C.I.A. official who is on loan to the National Infrastructure Protection Center, a federal agency created by President Bill Clinton, said a review of reports received by the federal government since Sept. 11 showed that electric installations "are under active physical surveillance."

"The bulk of these reports have been discounted as being not credible," Mr. Blumenthal said. "However, there are a few that really may represent an attempt to collect useful intelligence, operational information that could presage future attacks."

Charles E. Noble, the director of Information Technology Security at the ISO New England, the independent system operator for the six-state region, pleaded with the people who run power plants and transmission and distribution systems to report anything they saw so the reports could be analyzed and integrated, with help from the North American Electric Reliability Council, known as NERC.

"If you see suspicious people around, report it," Mr. Noble said. "The nuclear sites and some of the others, if you see airplanes flying around, report it. There's no way at the ISO level, NERC or the federal level we can respond if we don't know what's going on out there."

The conference was sponsored by the New York and New England independent system operators. It was held in the Cranwell Resort and Golf Club here, a complex of stately old buildings that have been recently restored and remodeled; as if to emphasize the centrality of electricity to American life, even the soap and paper towel dispensers in the restrooms at the conference center ran on electricity.

The electricity executives got a pep talk from James K. Kallstrom, the New York State director of public security, who said that a loss of electric service would have "a dramatic major impact to every facet of our economy." But speaking of the power plants and transmission lines, he added, "we have not built these things with the condition we have today in mind."

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Chicago Tribune  
February 27, 2002

## **Terror Puts Doomsday Clock Back In Motion**

By Jeremy Manier, Tribune staff reporter

Since the deepest chill of the Cold War, the occasional movements of the hands on the Doomsday Clock at the University of Chicago have served as an unofficial gauge of the threat that the world might plunge into nuclear Armageddon.

But when the clock's academic custodians move the hands closer to midnight on Wednesday morning for the first time in four years, the focus will be on a laundry list of dangers—including the increased risk of nuclear terrorism after Sept. 11.

Ten years ago, it was unclear whether such an icon of superpower confrontation would stay relevant after the end of hostilities between the U.S. and Russia. As the specter of apocalypse has changed, so has the meaning of the Doomsday Clock, dreamed up by U. of C. atomic researchers 55 years ago as a warning of impending nuclear doom. Now, after a decade of image overhaul, the clock's boosters say its message of disarmament has found new urgency. "It's gratifying in a sense that Sept. 11 has awoken people to a world that's still dangerous," said Stephen Schwartz, publisher of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, which has overseen the clock's movements since its inception in 1947. "We like to say we're more relevant than ever."

Bulletin officials Tuesday would not say precisely how far they plan to move the clock, which has stood at nine minutes to midnight since Pakistan and India tested nuclear weapons in 1998. But sources familiar with the decision said that when Nobel Prize-winning physicist Leon Lederman moves the minute hand on Wednesday, the new reading will be between five and seven minutes to midnight.

One reason for the change was the recognition after Sept. 11 that terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda are actively searching for nuclear material, said George Lopez, chairman of the bulletin's board and director of policy studies at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame. But he said the board also was disturbed by Bush administration decisions to weaken or pull out of numerous international agreements.

"It's difficult to make the case that emerging nations shouldn't test nuclear weapons when the U.S. makes continuing exceptions about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," Lopez said.

Lopez also pointed to the administration's lack of a plan to fully fund the Nunn-Lugar program, which helps protect Russian nuclear material from being stolen, and the decision to confront North Korea as part of an "axis of evil" rather than build on negotiations started in the Clinton administration.

In addition to nuclear threats, the new assessment is based on efforts by terrorists to obtain many different weapons of mass destruction, said Natalie Goldring, a member of the bulletin's board and director of the Program on Global Security and Disarmament at the University of Maryland.

"We now know the terrorists were trying to get access to nuclear material and biological weapons," Goldring said. Since the end of the Cold War, the group has expanded its mission to focus on global security issues rather than nuclear threats alone.

Such a move may have helped the bulletin avoid the fate of other peace advocacy groups that died with the Cold War. But they have slowly nudged the publication away from what a few former Manhattan Project scientists had in mind in 1945 when they started planning the journal at Stineway's Drugstore on 57th Street.

The bulletin's early agenda was summed up in a fundraising letter from Albert Einstein, who wrote, "The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe."

Critics say history has passed by the bulletin and its continuing plea for international cooperation on nuclear issues.

"This clock business is a scam," said Frank Gaffney, president of the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Security Policy. "These are people who are completely irrelevant to the process, who have been promoting this publicity scheme for decades. They have consistently advocated prescriptions that are simply wrong."

The group's deliberate pace has left it holding the bag of history at times.

The clock did not change between 1960 and 1963, when the hands were moved back. In the meantime, the group ignored the Cuban missile crisis, which many believe brought the world closer than ever to nuclear war.

For many, the Doomsday Clock still carries meaning.

"For a few moments, people will think about nuclear danger, and do their own calculation of how dangerous they think this is," said Joe Cirincione, director of the non-proliferation project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "In some ways there's a greater danger today of a nuclear explosion on American soil than there was 10 years ago."

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February 27, 2002

## **MoD carried out bio-warfare test on Tube travellers**

By Helen Studd

MINISTRY of Defence scientists carried out biological warfare tests on human guinea pigs on the London Underground in preparation for an attack on similar transport systems abroad.

In scenes out of a Cold War thriller, scientists from Porton Down's top secret Chemical and Biological Warfare establishment in Wiltshire used a scented face powder puff to test the spread of millions of bacterial spores throughout the Tube system in the 1960s.

The powder puff was filled with freeze-dried spores of the microbe *Bacillus globigii* mixed with talcum powder and thrown from a train on the northbound Northern Line between Colliers Wood and Tooting Broadway. When results of the first test on July 26, 1962, proved inconclusive, a second was carried out in May 1964.

Although the bacterium used was known to be harmless, it was connected to a variety of the more fatal anthrax. Other bacteria used in similar tests in California in 1950 had caused one man to contract an infection and die.

Highly sensitive papers released by the Public Record Office yesterday should have been made public in March 1995. Instead they are believed to have been held back for fear that the British Government might have been implicated in the Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo underground network that month.

Twelve people died when nerve gas, believed to have been hidden inside an umbrella, was released into the tube-train system and the attack spread fear throughout the Western world.

Although spores released in the two London tests contaminated nearly all Tube stations on the Northern Line from Wimbledon South to Camden Town, the trial on May 1, 1964, was not deemed "successful enough in its dispersal".

Instead the papers, marked secret from the Microbiological Research Establishment at Porton Down, concluded that "attempts will be made to improve its performance by searching for a more satisfactory means of dispersing it. In view of the difficulties involved in disseminating such organisms in public places it is proposed to carry out viability trials using the 'spider web' technique.

"In the meantime information is required on the viability of vegetative organisms in the Underground air."

A copy of the report was sent to the Chief Medical Officer, Sir George Godber, marked for his attention only, and the US Army CBR Agency. The long-term purpose of the tests was left unexplained.

A quantity of *Bacillus globigii* was obtained for the test from Fort Detrick in America. A scientist said that "the material became airborne at the least distance and appeared a most promising agent". *Bacillus globigii* is a non-hazardous bacterium used in tests to simulate anthrax, being similar and having the same size spore.

The agent was dropped from a train that had just left Colliers Wood, going north. A high concentration of the sample had reached Camden Town, more than ten miles away, just over 15 minutes later.

<http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/0,,2-220171,00.html>

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The Atlanta Journal-Constitution: 2.28.2002

## Agencies at odds over response to anthrax scare at Fort McPherson

By [RON MARTZ](#)  
and [DON PLUMMER](#)

Atlanta Journal-Constitution Staff Writer

The "seamless approach" to combatting terrorism promised by U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks appeared less than seamless last Friday at Fort McPherson.

After a suspicious white powder initially tested positive for anthrax, there was a breakdown in communications among some of the state and federal agencies involved. Then, Georgia National Guard officials say, a unit specially trained to detect weapons of mass destruction was denied access to the substance by the FBI.

The FBI instead sent the material to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta for laboratory testing. Guard officials, still frustrated over the slight, say the FBI decision delayed test results by a full day and left nearly 1,000 people who work in the building where the substance was found unnecessarily worried about whether they had been exposed to anthrax.

"With our equipment, we could have given them a 99.9 percent probability result that night instead of waiting 24 hours," said Maj. Jeff Allen, head of the 4th Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team, based at Dobbins Air Reserve Base in Marietta.

FBI officials said they acted properly. Spokesman Jeff Holmes said, "By the time the National Guard unit arrived, the substance was bagged and tagged as evidence and en route to the CDC."

Agencies responsible for Georgia's homeland defense are meeting today to review the sequence of events and whether their agencies responded appropriately, said Public Safety spokesman Jim Shuler. Col. Guy Shields, a spokesman for Army Forces Command at Fort McPherson, said officials are looking at their procedures. "What we're looking at is making sure that everybody who needs to get notified gets notified," he said.

The problems began just before 5 p.m. when a plastic envelope, about half the size of a business card, containing a powdery substance was found on the fourth floor of the U.S. Army Reserve Command headquarters building at the south end of the post.

Shields said the hazardous materials team from the post fire department was notified first and performed a field test that was positive for anthrax.

Then, said Shields, the agencies involved followed established protocol in making notifications.

Not included in the loop was the Georgia Emergency Management Agency, which has a 24-hour-a-day communications center designed to be the state's hub for terrorist attacks and natural disasters.

GEMA officials say they first learned of the anthrax scare on local television news.

The Atlanta Fire Department notified the Georgia National Guard team of the incident at 5 p.m., according to Allen. The 22-person team, each of whom has more than 1,000 hours of training, was on the scene by 6:20 p.m. with more

than \$3 million worth of state-of-the-art detection equipment, Allen said. Field tests of the type used by the Fort McPherson hazardous materials team are notoriously unreliable, he said.

The 4th Civil Support Team is one of 10 authorized by Congress several years ago because of fears of terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction. Originally there was one team for each of the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency regions, but the number of teams has grown to 32.

Saturday, after being shut out of the Fort McPherson incident, the team responded to an incident at the Lockheed plant in Marietta where a suspicious white powder was found, Allen said. The production line was shut down for several hours until the unit determined that the substance was foot powder.

<http://www.accessatlanta.com/ajc/terrorism/0202/0228anthrax.html>

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## Russia to join research on former Soviet bioweapons test range in Aral Sea

BBC Monitoring Service - United Kingdom; Feb 27, 2002

Almaty, 27 February: The Russian Ministry of Civil Defence, Emergencies and dealing with consequences of Natural Disasters will join the research work on Vozrozhdeniye island in the Aral Sea (in Central Asia), where biological weapons used to be tested [during the Soviet period].

The Russian deputy emergency situations minister, Gennadiy Korotkin, said in Almaty today that Kazakhstan and Russia are currently setting up a working group to draw up a plan to carry out the necessary research, determine the resources and the means which will be involved in carrying out research on the island and the sources for financing the work.

Korotkin noted that several options for financing the work are now being considered. For example, he said, some of the funds which Russia pays Kazakhstan for leasing the Baykonur space vehicle launching site [in southwestern Kazakh Kzyl-Orda Region], could be spent on studying the island.

According to Korotkin, the final agreement on the Russian emergency situations ministry's joining the research on Vozrozhdeniye island will be signed during the visit by Russian Minister of Civil Defence, Emergencies and dealing with consequences of Natural Disasters Sergey Shoygu to Kazakhstan in May 2002. Shoygu is expected to hold a meeting with Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev.

Korotkin said that a similar agreement would signed with the Uzbek leadership.

As was reported before, two-thirds of Vozrozhdeniye island's territory belongs to Uzbekistan and a third belongs to Kazakhstan.

[Passage to end omitted: the US has already allocated 6m dollars for investigating the island: large amounts of anthrax agents were buried on the island during the Soviet period]

Source: Interfax-Kazakhstan news agency, Almaty, in Russian 0947 gmt 27 Feb 02

<http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=020227007351>

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*Feb. 28, 2002, 5:28PM*

## Texas to get \$60 million for bioterrorism readiness

By T.A. BADGER

Associated Press

SAN ANTONIO -- Texas will get nearly \$60 million from federal agencies for bioterrorism readiness, Gov. Rick Perry said today.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention will provide about \$51 million to develop computer-based data management and communication systems, the governor said during a visit to Brooks Air Force Base.

Another \$8.3 million will come from the Health Resources and Services Administration to help hospitals prepare for bioterrorism incidents.

Perry said the money will be used to help the state become a national leader in being able to detect, trace and stop a biological attack.

"One of the keys to stopping a public health outbreak -- whether of natural causes or man-made -- is for health-care providers to have instant access to information," Perry said. "We live in a world that requires us to be prepared, be diligent and communicate better than before."

The federal funds will be administered by the Texas Department of Health.

Perry was accompanied by state Health Commissioner Dr. Eduardo Sanchez and Land Commissioner David Dewhurst, who heads the governor's task force on homeland security.

The visit also included a briefing on Brooks' bioterrorism response capabilities.

Brooks is a medical research and analysis center for the military, and a rapid-response hub for disease outbreaks.

The base is also home to the Lightweight Epidemiology Advanced Detection and Emergency Response System.

LEADERS, as it is known, is an Internet-based software system for sharing information between government agencies and hospitals to spot and react to disease trends that could indicate a localized bioterrorism incident.

"We need to be able to detect (a biological attack) locally because once it's at the national level, it's too late," said Jim Mantock of Richardson-based ScenPro Inc., one of the companies that developed the software. "We have to move faster than the disease. Once it gets going, it's a major problem."

<http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/metropolitan/1276396>

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Washington Post

March 1, 2002

Pg. 1

## **Shadow Government Is At Work In Secret**

### ***Spurred by Terror Threat, Bush Ordered 100 Officials to 'Bunker Duty' to Ensure Federal Survival***

By Barton Gellman and Susan Schmidt, Washington Post Staff Writers

President Bush has dispatched a shadow government of about 100 senior civilian managers to live and work secretly outside Washington, activating for the first time long-standing plans to ensure survival of federal rule after catastrophic attack on the nation's capital.

Execution of the classified "Continuity of Operations Plan" resulted not from the Cold War threat of intercontinental missiles, the scenario rehearsed for decades, but from heightened fears that the al Qaeda terrorist network might somehow obtain a portable nuclear weapon, according to three officials with first-hand knowledge. U.S. intelligence has no specific knowledge of such a weapon, they said, but the risk is thought great enough to justify the shadow government's disruption and expense.

Deployed "on the fly" in the first hours of turmoil on Sept. 11, one participant said, the shadow government has evolved into an indefinite precaution. For that reason, the high-ranking officials representing their departments have begun rotating in and out of the assignment at one of two fortified locations along the East Coast. Rotation is among several changes made in late October or early November, sources said, to the standing directive Bush inherited from a line of presidents reaching back to Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Officials who are activated for what some of them call "bunker duty" live and work underground 24 hours a day, away from their families. As it settles in for the long haul, the shadow government has sent home most of the first wave of deployed personnel, replacing them most commonly at 90-day intervals.

The civilian cadre present in the bunkers usually numbers 70 to 150, and "fluctuates based on intelligence" about terrorist threats, according to a senior official involved in managing the program. It draws from every Cabinet department and some independent agencies. Its first mission, in the event of a disabling blow to Washington, would be to prevent collapse of essential government functions.

Assuming command of regional federal offices, officials said, the underground government would try to contain disruptions of the nation's food and water supplies, transportation links, energy and telecommunications networks, public health and civil order. Later it would begin to reconstitute the government.

Known internally as the COG, for "continuity of government," the administration-in-waiting is an unannounced complement to the acknowledged absence of Vice President Cheney from Washington for much of the past five

months. Cheney's survival ensures constitutional succession, one official said, but "he can't run the country by himself." With a core group of federal managers alongside him, Cheney – or President Bush, if available – has the means to give effect to his orders.

While the damage of other terrorist weapons is potentially horrific, officials said, only an atomic device could threaten the nation's fundamental capacity to govern itself. Without an invulnerable backup command structure outside Washington, one official said, a nuclear detonation in the capital "would be 'game over.'"

"We take this issue extraordinarily seriously, and are committed to doing as thorough a job as possible to ensure the ongoing operations of the federal government," said Joseph W. Hagin, White House deputy chief of staff, who declined to discuss details. "In the case of the use of a weapon of mass destruction, the federal government would be able to do its job and continue to provide key services and respond."

The Washington Post agreed to a White House request not to name any of those deployed or identify the two principal locations of the shadow government.

Only the executive branch is represented in the full-time shadow administration. The other branches of constitutional government, Congress and the judiciary, have separate continuity plans but do not maintain a 24-hour presence in fortified facilities.

The military chain of command has long maintained redundant centers of communication and control, hardened against thermonuclear blast and operating around the clock. The headquarters of U.S. Space Command, for example, is burrowed into Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, Colo., and the U.S. Strategic Command staffs a comparable facility under Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska.

Civilian departments have had parallel continuity-of-government plans since the dawn of the nuclear age. But they never operated routinely, seldom exercised, and were permitted to atrophy with the end of the Cold War. Sept. 11 marked the first time, according to Bush administration officials, that the government activated such a plan. Within hours of the synchronized attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, Military District of Washington helicopters lifted off with the first wave of evacuated officials. Witnesses near one of the two evacuation sites reported an influx of single- and twin-rotor transport helicopters, escorted by F-16 fighters, and followed not long afterward by government buses.

According to officials with first-hand knowledge, the Bush administration conceived the move that morning as a temporary precaution, likely to last only days. But further assessment of terrorist risks persuaded the White House to remake the program as a permanent feature of "the new reality, based on what the threat looks like," a senior decisionmaker said.

Few Cabinet-rank principals or their immediate deputies left Washington on Sept. 11, and none remained at the bunkers. Those who form the backup government come generally from the top career ranks, from GS-14 and GS-15 to members of the Senior Executive Service. The White House is represented by a "senior-level presence," one official said, but well below such Cabinet-ranked advisers as Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card Jr. and national security adviser Condoleezza Rice.

Many departments, including Justice and Treasury, have completed plans to delegate statutory powers to officials who would not normally exercise them. Others do not need to make such legal transfers, or are holding them in reserve.

Deployed civilians are not permitted to take their families, and under penalty of prosecution they may not tell anyone where they are going or why. "They're on a 'business trip,' that's all," said one official involved in the effort. The two sites of the shadow government make use of local geological features to render them highly secure. They are well stocked with food, water, medicine and other consumable supplies, and are capable of generating their own power.

But with their first significant operational use, the facilities are showing their age. Top managers arrived at one of them to find computers "several generations" behind those now in use, incapable of connecting to current government databases. There were far too few phone lines. Not many work areas had secure audio and video links to the rest of government. Officials said Card, who runs the program from the White House, has been obliged to order substantial upgrades.

The modern era of continuity planning began under President Ronald Reagan.

On Sept. 16, 1985, Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 188, "Government Coordination for National Security Emergency Preparedness," which assigned responsibility for continuity planning to an interagency panel from Defense, Treasury, Justice and the Office of Management and Budget. He signed additional directives, including Executive Order 12472, for more detailed aspects of the planning.

In Executive Order 12656, signed Nov. 18, 1988, Reagan ordered every Cabinet department to define in detail the "defense and civilian needs" that would be "essential to our national survival" in case of a nuclear attack on

Washington. Included among them were legal instruments for "succession to office and emergency delegation of authority."

The military services put these directives in place long before their civilian counterparts. The Air Force, for example, relies on Air Force Instruction 10-208, revised most recently in September 2000.

Civilian agencies gradually developed contingency plans in comparable detail. The Agriculture Department, for example, has plans to ensure continued farm production, food processing, storage and distribution; emergency provision of seed, feed, water, fertilizer and equipment to farmers; and use of Commodity Credit Corp. inventories of food and fiber resources.

What was missing, until Sept. 11, was an invulnerable group of managers with the expertise and resources to administer these programs in a national emergency.

Last Oct. 8, the day after bombing began in Afghanistan, Bush created the Office of Homeland Security with Executive Order 13228. Among the responsibilities he gave its first director, former Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge, was to "review plans and preparations for ensuring the continuity of the Federal Government in the event of a terrorist attack that threatens the safety and security of the United States Government or its leadership."

*Staff researcher Mary Lou White contributed to this report.*

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Washington Times

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Pg. 11

## Inside The Ring

By Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough

### **Iraq fortifies**

Iraq's forces are making preparations for a U.S. military strike, according to U.S. intelligence officials. The Iraqis appear to be taking seriously President Bush's recent identification of Baghdad as constituting part of an "axis of evil" for its support for international terrorism and its development of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

According to the officials, satellite photographs have revealed that Iraqi military forces have begun building "berms" — earthen barriers — around key military facilities and equipment. The construction is a clear indication that the Iraqis believe a U.S. military strike is imminent.

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## Shutting Down The Russian Candy Store

***A U.S. non-proliferation approach to Russia must insist that Moscow live up to its word to not sell nuclear material on the black market***

By Joseph R. Biden Jr.

There are many sources for weapons of mass destruction, and it can take years to obtain or build them. But there's a shortcut, a place that has it all. It's a candy store of deadly arms. That place is Russia. Not a year goes by without a Russian being arrested for stealing nuclear material or attempting to sell it on the black market. And we know that Al Qaeda long ago contacted elements of the Russian mafia in search of nuclear material.

Preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and shutting down the candy store must be our foremost long-term objective in prosecuting the war on international terrorism. This would constitute a change from our efforts in recent years when the question of whether or not to develop and deploy a national missile defense consumed our national security debate.

Many Americans forget that without a nuclear, biological or chemical warhead, an ICBM is worthless. Last month, the National Intelligence Estimate declared that "U.S. territory is more likely to be attacked with weapons of mass destruction using non-missile means." After Sept. 11, no one should doubt that future attacks are far more likely to

come on a ship bearing a smuggled nuclear weapon, a vial of biological toxins in a backpack or a chemical agent dispersed in a crowded subway system. And our budget priorities must reflect the urgency of such threats. A year ago, Republican Howard Baker, a former senator and White House chief of staff, and Democrat Lloyd Cutler, a former White House counsel, chaired a bipartisan panel on the security of Russia's nuclear materials. Their conclusions were not encouraging. Their report said, "The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home."

With U.S. assistance over the past decade, Russia has made some progress in securing dangerous weapons and material, but more must be done. Following a year-long review, the Bush administration concluded that most of our non-proliferation assistance programs are cost-effective and beneficial to national security. But these conclusions are not reflected in the administration's budget proposal. Some programs receive small increases, others remain flat, still others are targeted for spending cuts.

We cannot afford to pinch pennies when Baker-Cutler argues \$3 billion per year would go a long way to address the problem. That's a lot of money, but we're spending \$7.8 billion on national missile defense research and development in fiscal year 2002 and the administration has requested a similar amount for fiscal year 2003. It doesn't make sense to focus on the potential last line of defense when we need to do so much to bolster the more achievable first line of defense.

What can we do with additional resources? For starters, we can double the size of the Department of Energy's \$174 million Materials Protection, Control and Accounting program, which safeguards Russia's nuclear materials. Russia recently signed an agreement to open up many more nuclear sites to U.S. assistance, providing an opportunity to substantially increase the security of nuclear stockpiles guarded by little more than a chain-link fence.

Additionally, we could reduce Russia's Soviet-era debt in return for Russian investment of the proceeds in non-proliferation programs. We hold more than \$3 billion in such debt, and our European allies hold several times that. Debt swaps are a win-win proposition: Russia can avoid an expected payment crunch next year while bolstering security through protection of sensitive materials and technologies.

Finally, high-level Russian officials say their government no longer sees strategic value in assisting Iran's long range missile and nuclear weapons programs. A comprehensive U.S. non-proliferation approach to Russia must insist Moscow live up to its word.

Denying access to bioterrorists and their supporters in rogue regimes to weapons of mass destruction is one of the most important battles we face. Shutting down Russia's candy store is the place to begin.

*Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.) is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.*

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